Socio-legal basis of criminal liability of legal persons and corporate compliance to prevent crimes: Anthropic approach and behavioral game theory

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.35295/osls.iisl.1830

Keywords:

Systems theory, collective action, cross-theoretical compliance, anthropic model, Teoría de sistemas, acción colectiva, cumplimiento transteórico, modelo antrópico, teoría del juego conductual

Abstract

Systems theory has garnered significant criticism from internationally recognized experts in the field of organizational analysis. However, a sector of criminal doctrine is adopting a strict approach to this theory to justify socio-legally the application of corporate criminal liability (this is a trend that has been embraced by the Spanish Supreme Court and is spreading throughout Latin America). The systemic idea of organization excludes the individuals who constitute and manage the company, dehumanizing it, separating corporate governance from the role played by individuals and even attributing human attributes to the company. In other words, the members that make up the organization, as well as the influences or constraints they generate in the context of the interaction of individuals within a corporation, are disregarded in the analysis. As an alternative, this text proposes the essential outlines of an "anthropic model" of corporate criminal liability, which is built on theoretically and experimentally validated notions and methodologies: neo-institutionalism, game theory and behavioral compliance. In this anthropic model, the adoption and implementation of an effective and adequate governance system to prevent irregularities (or crimes) does not depend on the system itself, but depends directly on the commitment and implementation of the "human component" of the organization.

La teoría de sistemas ha recibido críticas significativas por parte de expertos internacionalmente reconocidos en el campo del análisis de las organizaciones. Sin embargo, cierto sector de la doctrina penal está adoptando un enfoque estricto de esta teoría para justificar sociojurídicamente la aplicación de la responsabilidad penal de las empresas (una tendencia que ha sido aceptada por el Tribunal Supremo español y se está extendiendo por América Latina). La idea sistémica de la organización excluye del análisis a los individuos que constituyen y gestionan la empresa, deshumanizándola, separando la gobernanza corporativa del papel desempeñado por los individuos e incluso atribuyendo atributos humanos a la empresa. En otras palabras, se desestiman en el análisis penal tanto a los miembros que conforman la organización como a las influencias o constricciones que originan en ese contexto de interacción de individuos que configura la corporación. Como alternativa, se proponen los lineamientos esenciales de un “modelo antrópico” de responsabilidad penal corporativa, construido sobre nociones y metodologías teórica y experimentalmente validadas: neoinstitucionalismo, teoría de juegos y “behavioral compliance”. En este modelo antrópico, la adopción e implementación de un sistema de gobernanza efectivo y adecuado para prevenir irregularidades (o delitos) no depende del sistema en sí, sino que pende directamente del compromiso e implementación efectiva por parte del “componente humano” de la organización.

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Author Biography

Rafael Aguilera Gordillo, Loyola University

Director of the Diploma of Specialization in Compliance and associate professor of Criminal Compliance and International Security, Loyola University. Co-director of the postgraduate program on Criminal Liability of Legal Entities, Forensics, and Compliance Systems in International and National Frameworks, University of Valladolid. Academic visitor at Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Oxford. Academic member of the Anti-Corruption Academic (ACAD) initiative and GRACE initiative, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Co-director of the Compliance Advisory LAB, Grant Thornton. Academia.edu: https://uniloyola.academia.edu/RafaelAguileraGordillo Email: raguilera@uloyola.es

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Published

01-04-2024

How to Cite

Aguilera Gordillo, R. (2024) “Socio-legal basis of criminal liability of legal persons and corporate compliance to prevent crimes: Anthropic approach and behavioral game theory”, Oñati Socio-Legal Series, 14(2), pp. 530–553. doi: 10.35295/osls.iisl.1830.