



Against synecdochic thinking: Southern Criminology and the erasure of “Eastern Europe”

OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES VOLUME 16, ISSUE 5 (2026), 1957-1980: RECKONING WITH THE EAST: SITUATING SCHOLARSHIP FROM EASTERN EUROPE AND EURASIA IN CRIMINOLOGY AND SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES

DOI LINK: <https://doi.org/10.35295/OSLS.IISL.2465>

RECEIVED 8 SEPTEMBER 2025, ACCEPTED 17 JULY 2026, VERSION OF RECORD PUBLISHED 1 OCTOBER 2026

IVAN SHMATKO¹ 

Abstract

This article provides a friendly critique (Moosavi 2019) of Southern Criminology, arguing that this movement will be an exclusionary project if it remains committed to the idea of place. Examining the overlooking of “Eastern” and “South-Eastern Europe” in Southern Criminology, I argue that this might be due to place-based synecdochic thinking: using selective parts to represent the whole. My contention is that engaging in synecdochic thinking has produced representations in Southern Criminology that are selective and exclusionary in practice. Through discussing Russia’s re-imperialization war on Ukraine as well as examining the historical case of slavery from eastern and southeastern parts of “Europe,” I demonstrate the complex, fluid, and blurring “nature” of oppression that complicates southern-centred, decolonial analyses in this locality. The paper calls for the rejection of synecdochic thinking in favor of more complex understandings of epistemic injustice and how it is produced.

Key words

Southern Criminology, synecdochic thinking, Eastern Europe, epistemic injustice, Russian war on Ukraine

Resumen

Este artículo ofrece una crítica constructiva (Moosavi 2019) de la criminología del Sur, en la que se sostiene que este movimiento se convertirá en un proyecto excluyente si sigue aferrado a la idea del «lugar». Al analizar la omisión de «Europa Oriental» y «Europa Sudoriental» en la criminología del Sur, sostengo que esto podría deberse a un

I am grateful to Gavin Slade, alongside the editors and staff of the *Oñati Socio-Legal Series*, for their guidance and patience during the preparation of this manuscript. I also thank the anonymous reviewers for their time, effort, and valuable feedback.

¹ Ivan Shmatko. Washington and Lee University. Email: ishmatko@wlu.edu ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0009-0009-1930-8754>

pensamiento sinécdoque basado en el lugar: el uso de partes selectivas para representar el todo. Mi tesis es que el recurso al pensamiento sinecdóquico ha dado lugar, en la criminología del Sur, a representaciones que, en la práctica, resultan selectivas y excluyentes. A través del análisis de la guerra de reimperialización de Rusia contra Ucrania, así como del examen del caso histórico de la esclavitud en las regiones orientales y del sureste de «Europa», demuestro la «naturaleza» compleja, fluida y difusa de la opresión que complica los análisis descoloniales centrados en el Sur en este contexto. El artículo aboga por el rechazo del pensamiento sinecdóquico en favor de una comprensión más compleja de la injusticia epistémica y de cómo se produce.

Palabras clave

Criminología del Sur, pensamiento sinecdóquico, Europa del Este, injusticia epistémica, guerra de Rusia contra Ucrania

Table of contents

1. Introduction	1960
2. Southern Criminology and the problem of place	1960
3. Emplaced epistemologies and “fluidity of contemporary social relations”	1963
4. Synecdochic thinking: productive complexity of the “Orient of Europe”	1966
5. Local differentiations and the issue of the southern standpoint	1969
6. The “River of slaves” flowing from North to South.....	1970
7. Conclusion.....	1972
References.....	1973

1. Introduction

In June 2023, a bit more than a year after the beginning of the Russian full-scale invasion, I witnessed a horror that may stay with me for the rest of my life. I was one of the volunteers that rushed to the city of Kherson after the collapse of the Kakhovka Dam. I was therefore a witness of this tragic human-made ecological disaster.

Built in 1956, the Kakhovka dam was one of the largest in what is known as “Europe.” After it collapsed due to a series of explosions, it released about 16.4 trillion liters of water, rapidly flooding the area downstream (Shumilova *et al.* 2025). Around 110 thousand people and countless non-human animals were affected: hundreds drowned and thousands lost their homes forever (Shumilova *et al.* 2025). Up to one million people were left without the drinking water (UN Ukraine 2023) and around 83.3 thousand tons of highly toxic heavy metals contaminated the area (Shumilova *et al.* 2025). In the moment, however, I neither knew nor thought about those numbers. What I saw was the faces of the people that miraculously survived and yet lost everything they worked for their entire lives. I observed dogs just snatched from water by the rescue volunteers who were passing in their hurriedly obtained motor boats — those dogs now carried onto the shore, their fur still wet, their eyes full of fear. I looked at the city with whole neighborhoods suddenly flooded; water hiding mines that were washed off the Russian defense positions, now randomly lurking for victims. I finally saw how the war continued — no matter the ecological disaster — when one of the city improvised landing spots, packed with busy volunteers and shocked survivors, the latter just finally making their first steps on the land, was shelled by the Russian Grad rockets.

Being a PhD candidate in sociology and criminology at the time, I turned to my disciplines for answers. I sought explanations for what just happened in Kherson. Seeking some clarity on what I and thousands of victims of the Russian imperial project experienced, I particularly looked to those traditions of thought that made it their job to critically interrogate global inequalities, environmental harm, and colonial and imperial systems of domination. What I found in the literature, however, sometimes disappointed and sometimes infuriated me. The literature mostly stayed silent on the Russian imperial history and on its connection to what Frederick Cooper called “the most blatant contemporary instance of re-imperialization” (2025, 893; see also Plokhly 2023). The literature also had little to say about the war as such, and the “region” altogether (Piacentini and Slade 2023). Moreover, when the region was in this literature, I sometimes found Russian empire presented as a victim of “European” “warmongering” (Santos 2022) and portrayed in a positive light, as one of the useful alternatives to the “Global North” (Carrington *et al.* 2016, 6) and one of the better options in the face of the Global “re-Westernization” project (e.g. Mignolo 2023a, 2023b). This article, therefore, tries to understand how Southern Criminology, and possibly the larger diverse tradition of thinking about coloniality of knowledge, ended up in this heuristically puzzling conundrum.

2. Southern Criminology and the problem of place

Southern Criminology is a political project and a scholarly framework that draws our attention to epistemological inequalities in the discipline (Carrington *et al.* 2018, Fonseca 2018, Goyes *et al.* 2021). Following Connell (2007), Southern Criminology claims that

most of the established and recognized criminological theory has been produced in the North based on its specific realities, while the Global South has been mostly mined for data and largely seen as incapable of producing its own knowledges (Carrington *et al.* 2016). The framework seeks to rectify this injustice by “southernizing” criminology, i.e., making criminology more appreciative and inclusive of the experiences, histories, and epistemologies from the Global South (Carrington *et al.* 2018, Carrington, Dixon *et al.* 2019).

Thus, “Global South” sits at the very center of the Southern Criminology project. One can find “South” not just in the name, but also at the very overtly proclaimed goal of the project. The discipline, the argument goes, must open itself to knowledge that comes from a particular place called the “Global South,” while another particular place called the “Global North” — as Dipesh Chakrabarty would put it — needs to be epistemologically “provincialized” (2008). Southern Criminology scholars readily and preemptively acknowledge that such a place should not be treated only as a geographic reality: Southern Criminological literature typically declares that it sees South both through the lens of global inequality among regions and countries (e.g. Europe vs Africa) and as metaphor for power relations inside varied geographic places (Carrington, Hogg and Sozzo 2016, Carrington *et al.* 2018). Southern Criminology nevertheless remains tied to the idea of place in this latter, metaphorical understanding: Global North has its own South, the argument goes, and the Global South has its own North. For instance, poor black neighborhoods in Chicago are seen as being part of the “South.”

This conceptual move that Southern Criminology makes is understandable: the idea that we can best understand global inequalities by simply dividing the world into two opposite halves has met with strong criticism from scholars (e.g. Acharya 2014, Abdenur 2021, Waisbich *et al.* 2021, Murphy 2022, Patrick and Huggins 2023, Hogan and Stewart 2024). This idea has also been particularly weakened by the rise of China as a global political, economic, and scientific powerhouse (Murphy 2022). China’s investment practices in the Global South that are clearly made from the position of strength vis-à-vis its economic counterparts and China’s ever-growing projection of military power vis-à-vis its neighbors made it clear that the term “Global South” obfuscates major inequalities and political divides that exist outside the North (Kinyondo 2019, Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2019, Gong 2024).

These inequalities between “Southern” countries are clearly accompanied by multiple inequalities within them. On a declarative level, Southern Criminology does not ignore those internal national inequalities. Fonseca notes, for instance, that nations that belong to “Western democracies and developing countries” are full of “economic, power, racial and gender inequalities” that need to be accounted for (2018, 712). The modern world, Fonseca admits, is also characterized by the presence of “increasingly exclusive societies independent of national belonging” (2018, 712) that often have more in common with each other than with people living in adjacent poor neighborhoods. “Although a direct comparison between a North American urban ghetto and a Latin American shantytown would still require overlooking fundamental differences, the distance between those realities has been [getting closer],” claims Fonseca (2018).

While this latter statement may or may not be true, the Southern Criminological attachment to the idea of place creates difficulties when analyzing such intra-state

inequalities further. We know that “North American urban ghettos” and “Latin American shantytowns” are themselves places of internal power differentials and inequalities. The problem, then, is the following: if the “Latin American shantytown” is the *South of the South*, then extremely poor locals, women abused by their husbands, and folks at the bottom of the local gang hierarchy must be treated as *the South of the South of the South*. It gets only messier if we think that local extremely poor men who are *South of the South of the South*, under certain circumstances, can be a part of North when compared to some of the local women. How should they be seen then? There might be a temptation to dismiss this little thought experiment. However, I believe that it raises a critical question: whose epistemology criminologists may treat as Southern under conditions of nested power differentials? I will return to this issue later in the article.

I previously used the word “declarative,” not by accident. In practice, many Southern Criminology texts omit the above-mentioned difficulties, explicitly connect epistemologies to more common and static entities like countries, and ignore the ever-shifting, fluid, hybrid, and heterogeneous reality of these localities. Consider the following examples:

Galleguillos, citing Carrington *et al.* (2016, Carrington, Hogg *et al.* 2019), declares that for “Southern theorists, the South goes beyond a geographical division [...] where the North comprises Western Europe and North America and the South encompasses regions from Latin America, Africa, and Oceania” (Galleguillos 2024). Galleguillos proceeds by saying that “Southern criminologists recognize that the distinction between the South and the North is not a fixed category since we can identify characteristics of Southern societies in the North and vice versa” (Galleguillos 2024). However, immediately after this short declaration, Galleguillos starts writing almost exclusively in metageographic categories. His whole analysis afterwards is built on the widespread ordinary understanding of the Global South as countries and regions, betraying the proclamation he himself offered.

For instance, right in the next paragraph after the declaration, Galleguillos argues that Latin America (as a whole?) “is clearly part of the Global South,” undermining the very logic of the “recognition” that has been made before. He continues to say that because research “published in Latin America is mostly published by scholars based in the Global South and targets an audience mainly based in Latin America,” such research could be treated as “Southern” (Galleguillos 2024). This logic is obviously not relational, but geographic: it is the geographic location of researchers and the audience in particular countries that makes their research “Southern” or “Northern,” not their relationship vis-à-vis other people in those countries. The fact that researchers may be and, in fact, often are privileged in comparison to many people in the countries of their residence, is completely omitted. The same applies to the audience of their academic papers that typically consists of relatively well-educated public with higher education, not the Latin American dispossessed. Galleguillos’ analysis proceeds by the logic that defines “southernness” of academic papers simply by the geographic location where they were published.

Such an approach seems to be a pattern in Southern Criminology. Similarly to Galleguillos, for instance, Hogg *et al.*, despite acknowledging that “all societies are marked by centre/periphery relationships and hierarchies, reminding us that North/South should be regarded not simply or primarily as a geographical divide so

much as a metaphor for power relations that are pervasive" (Hogg *et al.* 2017, 5), nevertheless focus almost completely on "geographical distribution of academic knowledge" (Hogg *et al.* 2017, 2). That is, Hogg, Scott, and Sozzo, unfortunately, do not follow their own advice; instead, they treat North/South "simply or primarily as a geographical divide."

The same use of "South" could be generally found in other Southern Criminological texts. In his article on sociological research that explores links between political economy and punishment, Máximo Sozzo uses "South" in the geographic sense of the word (Sozzo 2022). He criticizes existing research for "the strong concentration of these explorations on national cases from the Global North." As an alternative, he offers the case of the Latin America, "region of the Global South" (Sozzo 2022, 369, 370). When writing about environmental destruction that he associates with "(neo)colonialism, coloniality, and imperialism," David Rodríguez Goyes similarly refers to particular regions, notably naming "Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Oceania" (Goyes 2023) and leaving the reader to wonder if environmental crimes and harm that stems from imperialism is limited only to those regions.

Finally, foundational texts in Southern Criminology operate under the same logic: because the terms "Global North," "Global South" are, given "their internal heterogeneity, breadth and vagueness, [...] easy prey to criticism" (Goyes *et al.* 2021) when they are used in a geographic sense, these texts claim a different, metaphorical interpretation of the terms. As soon as such claims are made, the foundational texts proceed to use the term "Global South" almost exclusively in the common old meaning, referring to regions and countries. Carrington *et al.* (2018), for instance, claim that future research should seek "Southern criminology dimensions in publications from other regions of the Global South such as Asia and Africa"; talk about "Latin American practitioners, students, and scholars based in the Global South"; and observe that Southern Criminology is "not as popular as one might expect in a Global South region". Finally, and crucially for this article, Carrington *et al.* also observe that there is an ongoing "shifting balance of global economic growth and power from North to South, to countries like Brazil, Russia, India, China and others (the so-called BRICS)" (Carrington *et al.* 2016, 6).

3. Emplaced epistemologies and "fluidity of contemporary social relations"

The quote about BRICs points us to the problem created by the implication that epistemologies are somehow attached to places, i.e. to the idea that epistemologies are located in particular localities (e.g. regions, countries) and among *bounded collectives* that inhabit them (e.g. nations). This problem is the problem of representation. As soon as one thinks with "places," one needs to think synecdochically, i.e. one does not think about the place in all its completeness. It is never possible to think about everything the place involves and all the elements that comprise it. One needs to allow parts to represent the whole. Think about "Europe" and, unless you have some very specific memories, you will immediately think about France and Germany, not Kosovo and Moldova. Think about France and Germany, and you will immediately think about Paris, not a small town on the periphery. Think about Paris and you will probably think about the Eiffel Tower, not the image of the Carrosserie Yildiz Avdis repair shop on Rue

des Pyramides. Finally, think about the Global South, and more often than not you may think about China and India, not Mauritius and Malawi.

Place-based synecdochic thinking is, therefore, fundamentally a process of erasure that privileges that which is symbolically loaded with value and that which stands as the big, the strong, and the powerful. This is the reason why we constantly see “Brazil, Russia, India, China” mentioned, rather than Malawi or Tajikistan, in both Southern Criminological and larger decolonial scholarship when it comes to the Global South. This is the same reason why when the same texts talk about “Europe”/“West,” they almost exclusively discuss France, Britain, and the US, not Montenegro or Transnistria. The erasure of not just “Eastern Europe,” but also of Roma peoples, Crimean Tatars, European Muslims, and Sámi peoples (among many others) from Southern Criminological texts should be seen in this light, then – the place of “Europe” is represented by a couple of maritime empires, Western Christianity, the Enlightenment. Epistemologically speaking, the place of “Europe”/“West” is reduced to a specific group of intellectuals (e.g. Kant, Husserl, Hegel, Marx, Weber, Durkheim etc.) who clearly represent neither all “European” people(s) nor the diverse epistemologies found among the varied populations that lived in the German and French states.

Places are typically contraposed, i.e. constructed vis-à-vis each other, as entities that have mutually exclusive, or at least distinct, characteristics. Orientalism explored by Said (2003), in that sense, is just one way of constructing two places: the Orient and the Occident, whereby one is everything that the other is not. This process of place making, therefore, requires certain work that aims to find particular characteristics that represent the whole of a place. Such work requires disregarding other characteristics, ones that do not stand a chance to become distinct characteristics of the whole, i.e. the particulars, the marginalias, the ones that could be easily disregarded because they are not backed by symbolic capital and the ones that belong to the already sidelined minorities.

This latter process also comes with a temptation. It may be tempting to place the disregarded marginalias of one contraposed entity at the center of another. *Some* Southern Criminological texts succumbed to the temptation; some indeed counterpose the “empirical specificities of the global North” to “forms and patterns of crime specific to the global periphery” (Carrington *et al.* 2016, 1). As soon as one sets the task of finding these forms and patterns that are different in the “periphery” there appears to be temptation to then portray the Global South through one of its extreme parts, as a place of “uncertainty and turbulence, instability and unpredictability, and rapid, chronic, and multidirectional shifts” (Mbembe 2021, 29). This is indeed what sometimes happens. Thus, what is “specific” to the “Global South” are: “violence, drugs and guns”; “drug wars”; “extreme levels of familial and communal violence and massive day-to-day contact with the criminal justice system”; “corruption, violence, expropriation of landowners, environmental degradation”; “law and order crackdowns”; “high levels of violence”; and a place where “drug cartels operated with impunity” (Carrington *et al.* 2016, 8-11). Similarly, Barberet and Carrington (2018) discuss gendered violence in the “Global South,” comparing it with what they call the “English-speaking North.” “[M]ost theories about gendered violence,” they argue, “have been based on the experience of predominantly white women from English-speaking countries in the Northern Hemisphere” and therefore focus on “domestic violence between intimate partners”

(Barberet and Carrington 2018, 824). In contrast, Barberet and Carrington focus on forms of gendered violence “more unique” to countries of the “Global South.” The authors proceed to name those “Southern” forms of violence: “child marriage, genital cutting, femicide, abduction, sexual and domestic slavery, and punishments for “honor” or “dowry” violations, such as zina, acid attacks and Sati” (Barberet and Carrington 2018, 824). One may wonder if such extreme cases of violence represent the whole of the Global South particularly well. After all, child marriage and female genital mutilation exist only in relatively small pockets of the world.

Many “Southern” people and societies would not recognize themselves in such description. Take, for instance, the association of the Global South with high levels of violence. Numerous apparently Southern societies are not in fact characterized by high levels of criminal violence, at least not in a narrow criminological sense. For instance, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and China have low homicide rates (UNODC 2025). In fact, homicide rates in many of those countries are equal or lower than the ones in Germany, France, and Denmark (UNODC 2025). Similarly, “drug wars” and “massive day-to-day contact with the criminal justice system” may not apply to much or most of the places in the Global South. As these basic facts reveal, the complexity and heterogeneity of the so-called Global South, not its contraposed similitude, require highlighting. It is notable, that the Global South is rarely represented in such a way, with places like Tuvalu appearing as an exception rather than the rule in the relevant literature (Pratt and Melei 2018).

As a result of contraposing and erasure, synecdochicality leads to reductionism and simplification, not the embrace of fluidity and complexity. Attachment to place therefore hardly serves researchers well when thinking about current ever-more fluid, moving, and heterogeneous world. This is a problem that has been faced before by social sciences, particularly anthropology due to its particular roots in studying “others.”

Anthropology has long associated cultures with geographic places. A discipline that was built on the practice of “going *somewhere*, preferably somewhere geographically, morally, and socially distant from the theoretical and cultural metropolis” (Appadurai 1986, 356-366, original emphasis), anthropology became accustomed to the idea that culture is what you find on a faraway island populated by a relatively small group of relatively homogenous natives. This particular notion of culture that is “so much on the foreground of the anthropological consciousness” (Appadurai 1986, 356), made anthropology ill-adapted to analysing large and mobile societies that are characterized by ever-growing migration, mixtures of cultural practices and hybridity of knowledge. As a result, anthropology had been left with the “unfinished business” of “developing a coherent theoretical stance toward complex cultures” (Hannerz 1986, 362) that constantly evade being pinned to a particular locality.

It is not surprising that any attempts, not just anthropological, to pin culture and knowledge to a particular place are often set up for failure. Communities around the world are often culturally varied and marked by divisions into different hierarchical, professional, gendered and otherwise differentiated groups. Criminologists have long known that different groups inside societies develop their own distinct cultures and knowledges. It is not coincidental, for example, that a large part of police research is concerned with a very particular way of experiencing, perceiving, understanding, and

acting upon the world that police scholars dubbed “police (sub)culture” (Reuss-Ianni 1983, Chan 1996, Campeau 2015, Reiner 2017). Police officers often joke and perceive space differently and ultimately develop particular ways of discerning required knowledge from interactions with people and with their environment (Van Maanen 1973, Van Hulst 2013).

As a result, some scholars even argue that it is possible to talk about multiple police (sub)cultures inside police agencies. Patrol officers are, of course, different from detectives (Reuss-Ianni 1983). Detectives, in turn, are different from crime analysts that work with data and spend their days in the office. Police (sub)cultures are also different from locality to locality: American patrol officers differ from Ukrainian patrol officers substantially enough for the latter to acknowledge and emphasize that difference as crucial (Shmatko 2023). Urban police officers certainly often do not act, know, or feel the same way as rural ones (Cain 1973). Even in one occupational group, one could differentiate among the multitude of varied cultures — all of them connected to different ways of understanding and knowing this world. Even in one particular place/locality, lines of distinction and differentiation are multiple and, as I discuss further in the case of “Eastern Europe,” are often “nested,” complicating any attempts to think knowledge/culture and surrounding inequality in spatially bounded terms.

Place, then, is always filled with complicated dynamic webs of varied cultures, all responsible for different ways of experiencing and knowing the world. Furthermore, places are also “fields” in the Bourdieusian sense (1993). That is, places are often characterized by competitive and hierarchical relationships in which knowledge production is subject to competition and inequality. That is not to say that there is no cooperation or that competition and inequality are the only forces operating in such places. In fact, cooperation, exchange, competition, and domination often go hand in hand. However, it is important to emphasize that places are also often spaces of competition, particularly when it comes to who obtains the ability to present those places to the outside world.

Just as anthropology had, Southern Criminology has a troubled relationship with the notion of place. It operates with an implicit notion that epistemologies exist in places. Southern Criminology “is still a dynamics of space” even when recognizing “that the North and the South may live next door wherever in the world” (Fonseca 2018, 712). While Fonseca claims that such a framing still allows “the rupture with a static view [and movement away from] fixed and rigid entities in order to emphasize the fluidity and diversity of contemporary social relations” (Fonseca 2018, 712), my contention is the opposite. Just as anthropologists discovered, locating cultures/epistemologies in places prevents researchers from understanding complexity and fluidity. This is evident by the absence of the extensive discussion of who belongs and who can represent the Global South — the key issue that I will return to later in the text.

4. Synecdochic thinking: productive complexity of the “Orient of Europe”

Erasure of what has been successfully constructed by some Enlightenment thinkers as “Eastern Europe” and the “Balkans” (Wolff 1994, 2010) from Southern Criminology is heuristically unproductive. These two “orient[s] of Europe” (Wolff 1995) offer a complicated and layered story that may help researchers understand the workings of

power and domination better than simpler synecdochalities. The areas that had been located on the borderlands of several, generally less visible than their maritime counterparts, empires, resist synecdochalities. Any attempt to represent “their history” and “their epistemologies” faces the reality of the Ottoman, German, Austro-Hungarian, Byzantine, and Russian empires that constantly and violently ebbed and flowed and the varied and diverse ethnic and religious composition, until significantly “flattened” by the Holocaust and mass Soviet deportations (Jasiak 2001, Kochanowski 2001, Subtelny 2001, Magocsi 2005, Webber *et al.* 2018). They further resist synecdochic thinking because of their history of dynamic, ever-shifting, nested, and fluctuating structures of oppression, under which the oppressor and the oppressed could switch positions, or occasionally even occupy both roles at the same time.

This area has been described by scholars as a place that is characterized by “inbetweenness” (Živković 2011), elasticity, and as something that is full of admixtures, gradations, and local differentiations (Todorova 2009, Živković 2011), as well as “varying degrees of Europeanness and Eastness” (Kuus 2004). It is “simultaneously “inside” and “outside” Europe” (Zarycki 2014, 3), it is the “other within” (Todorova 2009), a symbolically imagined borderland that incorporates “East” and “West,” tainted/blessed by both worlds (Plokhy 2015). It presents us with a complex picture of the “nesting” (Bakić-Hayden 1995, Todorova 2009) of symbolic and material inequalities. Unlike binary and dichotomous oppositions that create an illusion of clarity by contraposing the extremes, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe presents us with a messy and muddy (Živković 2011) reality. Because these regions offer no simplicity – they should nicely test the conceptual apparatus of Southern Criminology.

Eastern Europe from the onset was the “depository of stereotypes of backwardness” (Parvulescu 2019, 473). Many of those who became labelled as “Eastern Europeans” responded not with resistance to this intra-European orientalizing, but with a complex set of internal distinctions. As Zarycki argues: “One of the key ways of coping [...] has been to transfer the oriental stigma to more eastern neighbors — those placed “lower” in the symbolic hierarchy of European space” (2014, 256; see also Kuus 2004, Živković 2011). Scholars described such arrangements as “nesting orientalisms” (Bakić-Hayden 1995) and “gradients of depreciation” (Živković 2011). The result was a complex system of relations that meant that almost everyone was both the orientalized and orientaler, both the subject of depreciation and the depreciator at the same time. This symbolic complexity matched the complexity of the history of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. As Parvulescu reminds us, “Eastern Europe [...] served as a platform for a number of imperial projects” (2019, 473), most of which were either continental empires with limited or non-existent overseas colonies, such as the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, or both continental and non-Western like the Ottoman Empire. Parvulescu points to further complexity in the region:

[T]he rub when one studies this region’s relation to coloniality is to acknowledge the presence of multiple imperial histories in any given local geography. It is not unusual for an East European locale to find itself in a postcolonial relation to Ottoman or Russian imperial projects (sometimes both) and, following different temporalities, in a semi-colonial relation to parts of West Europe. It is not unusual for the same East European locale to have an imperial or aspirationally imperial history itself (Parvulescu 2019, 473-474).

The states of Poland and Serbia present us with good examples. Both state formations, at various times, participated in imperial or neo-imperial projects and yet both were also subject to colonization by the Russian, German and Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman empires. This complexity stands in stark contrast with the picture that one often finds in many Southern Criminological texts that much more clearly demarcate the colonizer and the colonized. Thus, Southern Criminology has a similar problem to post-colonial theory that reflects “a symptom of an insidious Eurocentrism, whereby postcolonial theory prioritizes the study of West European empires” (Parvulescu 2019, 473).

This temporarily dynamic, unstable, fluid, and dual position characterizes various parts of eastern and south-eastern parts of Western Eurasia. As historian Yaroslav Hrytsak reminds us, Ukrainian state, a recent victim of Russian aggression itself, offers us an example of such a complex history:

[...] Ukraine’s two roles—as the core of the Russian and Soviet projects, on the one hand, and as the center of anti-imperial and anti-Soviet resistance, on the other—represent two opposite extremes in the varieties of Ukrainian colonial experiences. Ukraine’s two roles under Russian and Soviet rule represent these two opposites, while the Habsburg case would fall somewhere in between. And yet each of these cases in one way or another defies the dichotomies of center/periphery, colonial/colonialized, colonizer/colonized, oppressor/victim, modernized/backward (Hrytsak 2015, 733-734).

Before this historical argument is dismissed, the reader must be reminded, perhaps, that this past shapes the present. Wars in former Yugoslavia, while not reducible to history, were certainly shaped by the long clash of empires in “the Balkans.” It is also not an accident that the WWI and the first, largely currently omitted wave of decolonization (see Snyder 2015) that followed (due to the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, German, and Russian land empires), began in south-eastern parts of “Europe”.

Indeed, the Byzantine, Ottoman, German and Austro-Hungarian imperial legacy remains strong in the regions that we refer to as the “Balkans” and “Eastern Europe” (Todorova 2009, Živković 2011). It could be found in religious divides (e.g. Islam and Orthodoxy), architecture, language (e.g. Cyrillic alphabet), legal norms, criminal process, political ambitions (e.g. “Third Rome”), and wars (e.g. ambitions to control Crimea due to the Russian imperial imagined continuity with Greek and Byzantine history). The city that was mentioned at the beginning of this article is a good example of how these local deep histories, shaped by imperial imagination and practice, continue to shape the present: Kherson was founded by the Empress Catherine II in 1778 as part of her “Greek Project” – a process of mass population displacement accompanied by toponymic erasure. The renaming served to construct imperial continuity and claim Russian inheritance of the Greek “civilization” on a conquered land. Hence, the name of the city: Kherson was named after the ancient Crimean Greek colony of Chersonesus. As evidenced by the actions of those who made the decision to invade Ukraine, “Greek project” is not simply history to them (Chernova and Picheta 2022).

As Timothy Snyder reminds us, “colonial” is often used in a way that creates a binary whereby “Europeans (and sometimes Americans and occasionally the Japanese) [are placed] on one side of a divide and the rest of the world and its inhabitants on the other.” It could not be more misleading, as in reality “empire and resistance do not separate Europe from the rest of the world” (Snyder 2015, 696). What we know as “Europe” was

itself a space of intense imperial rivalry, conquest, exploitation as well as struggles against empires and for ethnic, religious, epistemological, and “national” liberation.

This leads me to another important point. Gayatri Spivak once argued that there might be some use in “unmooring” postcolonialism “from its provisional beginnings in monopoly capitalist or mercantile colonialisms” (Spivak 2006, 828; see also Abu-Lughod 1991). Indeed, both Southern Criminology and its many intellectual predecessors begin the conversation about global inequalities with “Western” domination in the 16th century (Carrington *et al.* 2018; see also Mignolo 2021). Southern and eastern parts of “Europe” have been significantly impacted by varied pre-capitalist and “Southern” empires and therefore allow us to think in a way that will finally accomplish the “unmooring.”

5. Local differentiations and the issue of the Southern standpoint

As noted above, the places that are implied by the term “the Global South” are extremely diverse, and therefore the concept of the Global South may not be useful as an analytical category (Abdenur 2021). The growing political and economic inequalities among countries of the South and in particular the rapid rise of India and China as regional and global players creates an environment where the interests and perceptions of many in the South continue to diverge (Acharya 2014, Waisbich *et al.* 2021, Murphy 2022, Patrick and Huggins 2023). Scholars even differentiate between two Souths, “a subset of poorer and smaller countries that are subordinated by more powerful countries such as China and India, mirroring the North-South dynamic within the Global South grouping itself” (Hogan and Stewart 2024).

In this vein, if our aim is to bring “Southern” understandings into mainstream discussions in criminology, we cannot allow ourselves to ignore the local frameworks through which multiple Souths see themselves and the world around them. To remain oblivious to local understandings and instead to impose our categories would be nothing less than symbolic violence. Take examples of Sudan, Ukraine, Türkiye, and Iran. They are similar in at least one regard. The commonality is certainly not in epistemologies of the people that live in those extremely different places, but rather in the intense conflicts around language, memory, identity, and knowledge that play out inside those societies or with their neighbours. The areas that currently correspond to the nation states of Sudan, Ukraine, Türkiye, and Iran are all marked by histories that predate Western domination and conflicts around difference that, while influenced by the actions of Western empires, have their own dynamic and their own roots that could not be simply reduced to the North/South divide (Majeska 2009, Yavuz 2020, Free 2023). Western colonialism, after all, as Gupta and Ferguson pointedly claim, is just one of the forms of “interconnection” (1992, 8) that, arrives not universally, comes unevenly, and appears relatively recently in historical terms.

No less significant is the fact that many people in those places trace their histories and their cultures to the times before Western colonialism. Some in Iran proudly point to their own Persian Empire as a place in which their culture blossomed and in which they see their roots (Marszałek-Kowalewska 2011). Many Arabic speaking people in Sudan can trace their roots to the Arabic migration of the 12th century, seven centuries before the British came (Prunier 2005). Many Turks, while Westernized by the reforms and violence of Atatürk, trace their culture and history to the Ottoman Empire (Karpat 2000,

Yavuz 2020). Ukrainians, if asked, would talk about the medieval state of Kievan Rus that in practice was influenced by relations with the Byzantine Empire much more than by anything that would be later known as the “West,” including the enormously impactful adoption of Eastern Christianity and the arrival of literacy via the Cyrillic alphabet (Majeska 2009).

Local differences are crucial here, drawing thick differentiating lines within and across the Global South. Ukraine provides a vivid example. Sparked by the Russian invasion, Ukrainians found themselves in heated discussions about culture, language, and knowledge as well as their connections to the several colonial and imperial projects that influenced the locality and people that inhabit it (Betlii 2022, Latysh 2024). This discussion concerned ideas, names, practices, and ways of knowing, acting, thinking, naming, and talking. All were in some way impacted (tainted?) by colonialism, and it is still a matter of contested debate as to how “tainted” ideas, names, practices, and ways of talking should be treated. There is sharp disagreement, accompanied by political contest to create, codify, and narrate “Ukrainian history” (Kasianov 2022). This disagreement would even include the basic questions of who could be treated as Ukrainian and who should be able to participate in the debate in the first place. Lines are drawn across multiple fault lines: between people who left the country during the war and those who stayed; those who avoided military service and those who served; and people of diverse ethnic and religious affiliations, to name a few. Similarly, the most contested epistemologies in Ukraine (and beyond, in the region) are often not the ones that come from the “West,” but those that are perceived to be epistemologies of the local dominant colonial projects. As such, there is also no consensus on the question as to whether the conversation should be solely about the Russian imperial projects or whether Austro-Hungarian, Polish, and Ottoman colonialisms should also be included in the critical reevaluation.

Numerous local conflicts over representation of the whole of a “nation,” “people,” “region” and other synecdochic entities should make researchers question the idea that there could be “metropolitan thinking” or “southern standpoint” (Carrington *et al.* 2016, 8, 10). Both the Global North and the Global South are sites of contestation over the representation, where people with most symbolic, economic, and cultural resources generally manage to become the very parts that obtain the possibility to represent the whole. This is precisely the reason why “subaltern cannot speak” (Spivak 2010).

6. The “River of slaves” flowing from North to South

Southern Criminology pays particular attention to transatlantic slavery. It justifiably points to the role of historic forms of this extreme form of subjugation and oppression as one of the root causes of the current shape of the criminal justice system in the US. For instance, Hogg *et al.* rhetorically ask: “Can an understanding of contemporary US mass incarceration and “penal exceptionalism” be adequately grasped without reference to the history of the forced removal of millions of Africans to the Americas, as the foundation of a slave-based plantation economy in the American South?” (Hogg *et al.* 2017, 6). The question I would like to ask in return is the following: can criminologists also understand something by looking at other extreme forms of subjugation such as slavery and serfdom outside of the transatlantic boundaries?

The previously mentioned parts of “Europe” present us with a good case *to think with*. The origins of state formation for East Slavs lie in slavery. The slave trade, together with trade in honey and fur, created Rus’, a medieval state that grew out of the ambitions of Viking settlers to control the trade routes along the Dnipro and Volga rivers. Those routes led south and provided access to the enormous markets of Baghdad and Constantinople (Micheau 2008). Slaves were exported to Byzantium and the Abbasid Caliphate and elsewhere in exchange for silver, silk, and other goods (Kovalev and Kaelin 2007). Trade was so large and notable that Islamic geographers referred to the rivers along which slaves were transported as *nahr al-Saqaliba* — rivers of slaves (Pritsak 1970).

Slavery also continued to play an enormous role in the life of many Eastern Slavs up to the 19th century though destinations changed (the Mamluk Sultanate and the Ottoman Empire were major slave-destination centres in later centuries) and the means of obtaining slaves evolved. By the 19th century, slaves were predominantly captured in Tatar raids from what is today Southern Ukraine. What we know now as Central and Western Ukraine as well as some present-day Belarussian, Polish, and Russian territories has for a long time been a part of what Fynn-Paul called a “slaving zone” (2009), an area of “permanent man-hunting” (Gliwa 2022, 187; Kravets and Ostapchuk 2022). This regional slaving zone extended “to the north of the Black Sea as far as the Vistula and Oka [rivers]” (Kołodziejczyk 2022, 437). Slaving raids peaked in the 16th and 17th centuries with around two million captured over the period between 1500 and 1700, according to some estimations (Kołodziejczyk 2022). Slave raids in what is now Ukraine, often accompanied by mass slaughter, had a profound impact on the area, leading to depopulation of a large part of Ukraine and even to an ecological shift, as the abandoned lands became steppe (Dashkevych 1993).

The events left a strong mark on collective memory, folklore, and literature (Gliwa 2021). The history of slavery also lives on in stories and legends that are well-known (albeit somewhat differently) in both contemporary Türkiye and Ukraine, such as the story of Hürrem Sultan or Roksolana, a slave who grew into an influential figure in the Ottoman court (Peirce 2017). The self-perception and self-knowledge of modern Ukrainians, especially during the current war with Russia, strongly rely on Cossack myths of indomitability that were constructed during these events (Plokhly 2012). Cossacks are often seen in Ukraine as defenders of freedom; free spirits who do not obey authority, and who defended peasants from Tatar slave raids. The historical record is, of course, more complicated. The Cossacks themselves participated in slave raids (Kravets and Ostapchuk 2022). Indeed, Roşu described the complexity that the slave zone around the Black Sea offers in comparison to slavery in the Americas:

the Black Sea region was characterized by a marked fluidity of roles: the Tatars or the Cossacks could be both raiders and slaves, in contrast to the situation in North America, for instance, where the introduction of race as a criterion of (un)freedom led to a system that created a much more stable division of roles. [...] Anyone [in the Black Sea region] could become enslaved just as anyone could regain his or her freedom [...] Individuals often crossed political and religious frontiers in pursuit of new prospects or as victims of enslavement; sometimes they [...] fully participated in raids against their old home territories (Roşu 2022, 6).

Slavery around the Black Sea area was much more fluid, not ingrained in racial categories, rooted in pre-capitalist history, and was driven by non-Western empires. Unfortunately, as Roşu points out, the “Black Sea has been virtually absent” from the general historical discussion of slavery. This is despite the fact that “the region constituted one of the main slaving hubs on the frontier between Europe and the rest of the world from the ancient period to the 19th century” (Roşu 2022, 3) and shaped the lives of millions of people.

Eventually, in a complex chain of unintended consequences, the Byzantine-inspired “Third Rome” ambitions of the Russian Empire (Kalb 2008) and Tatar slave raids on Russian border territories led to the Russo-Turkish wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. They in turn enlarged the Russian Empire and led to several expulsions of Tatars from Crimea, including Stalin’s genocidal mass deportations in the twentieth century (Fisher 1987, Williams 2002, Blank 2015).

Slavery remained an important and fundamentally shaping phenomenon in the political, social, and legal history of Eastern European localities. Slavery was tied to the crucial decisions, including the creation of first states, adoption of Eastern Christianity from Byzantium, creation and development of language, legal, and linguistic traditions and the future territorial contests and political alliances. The decision has shaped both the identity of local peoples as well as political events up until today. Russian imperial ambitions, its hostility towards “the West” and the current war on Ukraine are not reducible, but still is rooted in the image of Russia as a “Third Rome” whereby Russia is perceived to be the rightful inheritor of the Christian mission and “Greek civilization” after the fall of Constantinople (Kalb 2008).

The case of slavery and slave trading in and from what we now call “Eastern Europe” should be of interest to Southern Criminology. Yet, just as this area and its peoples are elided by synecdochic thinking, so the local history of slavery has also been overlooked in favour of cases that fit better within the North/South dichotomy. The practice, with its highly specific local dynamics and shifting of slaver and slave roles, speaks to the issues I have raised: the need for unmooring of epistemologies from places. Synecdochic thinking that arrives as soon as one ties places to epistemologies brings with it a set of erasers. The outcome of this is the loss of the ability to construct complex understandings of global power and inequality.

7. Conclusion

For people who lived for generation on the “bloodlands” (Snyder 2010) of “Eastern” and “South-Eastern Europe,” sandwiched between shrinking and expanding empires, and whose family histories are tales of tragedy and destitution caused by multiple imperial ebbs and flows, it may perhaps be puzzling why their lives, experiences, and epistemologies are “locked out” (Piacentini and Slade 2023, 2). Southern Criminology sometimes lumps them together with the place of “Europe” or the “Global North” and therefore sees them as responsible for privileges that they rarely had and that were, in fact, built at their own expense. Peasants from one of the poorest peripheral lands on Austro-Hungarian empire, Galicia (currently split between Poland and Ukraine), had to leave their homeland *en masse* in search of better life in Canada, Brazil and elsewhere due to extreme poverty (Petryshyn and Dzubak 1985, Cipko 1986, Gulka-Tiechko 1991,

Frank 2005). Before the invasion, the descendants of those who eventually remained in Galicia had to leave their families and move to Poland, Hungary, and Italy as cheap labour, as construction workers and caregivers, factory personnel and taxi drivers, sex-workers and nurses (Fedyuk 2009, Fedyuk and Kindler 2016). After the Russian invasion, they had to go the frontline to fight in a brutal re-imperialization war. Southern Criminology has paid no heed to them. They fell through the cracks, somewhere in between the “Global North” and the “South.”

In this article, I have tried to show that this form of exclusion is perhaps no accident but the result of attachment to the idea of places in the move to decolonize criminology. Thinking with places encourages us to engage in synecdochic thinking whereby a part is always selected to represent the whole. This, in turn, leads to exclusion. In the case of Southern Criminology, attachment to the idea of places led to the overrepresentation of Britain and other maritime empires as the “North” and “Europe” as well as *some* of their victims as the whole of the “South”. Many other peoples and experiences, particularly those in “Eastern” and “South-Eastern Europe,” became invisible.

What happened to the people, non-human animals, and the environment due to the military destruction of the Kakhovka dam was a terrible crime, just one among thousands committed in a war of re-imperialization, yet Southern Criminologists have hardly paid attention. I wrote this paper in the hope that that will change. There is a strong need for a more equal, decolonized, representative and democratic criminology. The real question is if subscribing to the “booming category” (Haug *et al.* 2021) of the “Global South” helps us achieve this goal or rather leads us astray.

References

- Abdenur, A., 2021. Climate and security: UN agenda-setting and the “Global South.” *Third World Quarterly* [online], 42(9), 2074–85. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.1951609>
- Abu-Lughod, J. L., 1991. *Before European hegemony: The world system A.D. 1250-1350* [online]. Oxford University Press. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195067743.001.0001>
- Acharya, A., 2014. Global International Relations (IR) and regional worlds: A new agenda for international studies. *International Studies Quarterly* [online], 58(4), 647–659. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12171>
- Appadurai, A., 1986. Theory in anthropology: Center and periphery. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* [online], 28(2), 356–61. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417500013906>
- Bakić-Hayden, M., 1995. Nesting orientalisms: The case of former Yugoslavia. *Slavic Review* [online], 54(4), 917–31. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.2307/2501399>
- Barberet, R., and Carrington, K., 2018. Globalizing Feminist Criminology: Gendered violence during peace and war. In: K. Carrington *et al.*, eds., *The Palgrave handbook of criminology and the Global South* [online]. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 729-751. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65021-0_39

- Betlii, O., 2022. The identity politics of heritage: Decommunization, decolonization, and derussification of Kyiv monuments after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. *Journal of Applied History* [online], 4(1-2), 149-169. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1163/25895893-bja10031>
- Blank, S., 2015. A double dispossession: The Crimean Tatars after Russia's Ukrainian war. *Genocide Studies and Prevention* [online], 9(1), 18-32. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.9.1.1271>
- Bourdieu, P., 1993. *The field of cultural production*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Cain, M., 1973. *Society and the policeman's role*. London: Routledge.
- Campeau, H., 2015. "Police culture" at work: Making sense of police oversight. *The British Journal of Criminology* [online], 55(4), 669-687. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azu093>
- Carrington, K., Dixon, B., et al., 2019. Criminologies of the Global South: Critical reflections. *Critical Criminology* [online], 27, 163-189. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-019-09450-y>
- Carrington, K., et al., 2018. Criminology, Southern Theory and cognitive justice. In: K. Carrington et al., eds., *The Palgrave handbook of criminology and the Global South* [online]. Palgrave Macmillan, 3-19. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65021-0_1
- Carrington, K., Hogg, R., and Sozzo, M., 2016. Southern Criminology. *The British Journal of Criminology* [online], 56(1), 1-20. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azv083>
- Carrington, K., Hogg, R., et al., 2019. *Southern criminology*. London: Routledge.
- Chakrabarty, D., 2008. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial thought and historical difference* [online]. Princeton University Press. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400828654>
- Chan, J., 1996. Changing police culture. *The British Journal of Criminology* [online], 36(1), 109-134. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.bjc.a014061>
- Chernova, A., and Picheta, R., 2022. Russia removes bones of 18th-century commander revered by Putin from occupied Ukrainian city. *CNN* [online], 28 October. Available at: <https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/28/europe/potemkin-remains-removed-kherson-ukraine-russia-intl>.
- Cipko, S., 1986. The legacy of the 'Brazilian Fever': The Ukrainian colonization of Parana. *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, 11(2), 19-32.
- Connell, R., 2007. *Southern Theory: The global dynamics of knowledge in social science* [online]. Cambridge: Polity Press. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.22459/AHR.44.2008.04>
- Cooper, F., 2025. Decolonizing decolonization. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* [online], 67(4), 890-915. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417525100108>

- Dashkevych, J., 1993. Iasyr z Ukrainy (XV–persha polovyna XVII st.) iak istoryko-demografichna problema [Jasyr from Ukraine (XV–first half of XVII) as historico-demographic problem]. *Ukrains'kyj Arheografichnyi Shchorichnyk*, 2, 40–47.
- Fedyuk, O., 2009. Death in the life of Ukrainian labor migrants in Italy. *Migration Online* [online], 1-20. Available at: https://aa.ecn.cz/img_upload/6334c0c7298d6b396d213ccd19be5999/OFedyuk_DeathinthelifeofUkrainianlabormigrantsinItaly_1.pdf
- Fedyuk, O., and Kindler, M., eds., 2016. *Ukrainian migration to the European Union: Lessons from migration studies* [online]. Cham: Springer. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41776-9>
- Fisher, A. W., 1987. Emigration of Muslims from the Russian Empire in the years after the Crimean war. *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 35(3), 356–371.
- Fonseca, D. S., 2018. Punishment at the margins: Groundwork for a revisited sociology of punishment. In: K. Carrington et al., eds., *The Palgrave handbook of criminology and the Global South* [online]. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 709-729. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65021-0_34
- Frank, A. F., 2005. *Oil empire: Visions of prosperity in Austrian Galicia*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Free, A., 2023. Putin's Crimea mythmaking. *Wilson Center* [online], 2 March. Available at: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/putins-crimea-mythmaking>
- Fynn-Paul, J., 2009. Empire, monotheism and slavery in the greater Mediterranean region from antiquity to the early modern era. *Past & Present* [online], 205(1), 3–40. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gtp036>
- Galleguillos, S., 2024. How southern is Southern Criminology in Latin America? *Theoretical Criminology* [online], 28(3), 287-308. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/13624806231213953>
- Gliwa, A., 2021. *Pamięć Przeszłości. Doświadczenie Najazdów Tatarskich w Pamięci Zbiorowej Mieszkańców Gminy Przeworsk* [Collective Memory among the Peasants of Przeworsk County] (online). Gmina Przeworsk. Available at: <https://www.przeworsk.net.pl/asp/pdf.asp?typ=14&sub=240&menu=243&strona=1&schemat=3>
- Gliwa, A., 2022. How captives were taken: The making of Tatar slaving raids in the early modern period. In: F. Roşu, ed., *Slavery in the Black Sea Region, c.900-1900: Forms of unfreedom at the intersection between Christianity and Islam* [online]. Leiden: Brill, 187–249. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004470897_009
- Gong, X., 2024. The challenges behind China's global south policies. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* [online], 11 December. Available at: <https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2024/12/the-challenges-behind-chinas-global-south-policies>
- Gulka-Tiechko, M., 1991. Ukrainian immigration to Canada under the railways agreement, 1925-30. *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, 16(1), 29–59.

- Gupta, A., and Ferguson, J., 1992. Beyond 'culture': Space, identity, and the politics of difference. *Cultural Anthropology* [online], 7(1), 6–23. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1525/can.1992.7.1.02a00020>
- Hannerz, U., 1986. Theory in Anthropology: Small is beautiful? The problem of complex cultures. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 28(2), 362–67.
- Haug, S., Braveboy-Wagner, J., and Maihold, G., 2021. The 'Global South' in the study of world politics: Examining a meta category. *Third World Quarterly* [online], 42(9), 1923–44. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.1948831>
- Hogan, E., and Patrick, S., 2024. A closer look at the Global South. *Carnegie Endowment for Democracy* [online], 20 May. Available at: <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/05/global-south-colonialism-imperialism?lang=en>
- Hogg, R., Scott, J., and Sozzo, M., 2017. Southern Criminology: Guest editors' introduction. *International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy* [online], 6(1), 1–7. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.5204/ijcjsd.v6i1.395>
- Hrytsak, Y., 2015. The postcolonial is not enough. *Slavic Review* [online], 74(4), 732–37. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.5612/slavicreview.74.4.732>
- Jasiak, M., 2001. Overcoming Ukrainian resistance: The deportation of Ukrainians within Poland in 1947. In: A. Siljak and P. Ther, eds., *Redrawing nations: Ethnic cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944–1948* [online]. London: Rowman & Littlefield, 173–197. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.5040/9798216411321.ch-8>
- Kalb, J. E., 2008. *Russia's Rome: Imperial visions, messianic dreams, 1890–1940*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Karpat, K. H., 2000. Introduction: Turks remember their Ottoman ancestors. In: K. H. Karpat, ed., *Ottoman past and today's Turkey* [online]. Leiden: Brill, viii–xxii. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004492271_002
- Kasianov, G., 2022. National master narrative: Vicissitudes of method. *AREI: Journal for Central and Eastern European History and Politics* [online]. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.54881/111nmgk>
- Kinyondo, A., 2019. Is China recolonizing Africa? Some views from Tanzania. *World Affairs* [online], 182(2), 128–164. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0043820019839331>
- Kochanowski, J., 2001. Gathering Poles into Poland: Forced migration from Poland's former eastern territories. In: A. Siljak and P. Ther, eds., *Redrawing nations: Ethnic cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944–1948* [online]. London: Rowman & Littlefield, 135–155. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.5040/9798216411321.ch-6>
- Kołodziejczyk, D., 2022. Slavery and the slave trade in the Atlantic and the Black Sea: A comparative view. In: F. Roşu, ed., *Slavery in the Black Sea region, c.900–1900: Forms of unfreedom at the intersection between Christianity and Islam* [online]. Leiden: Brill, 418–442. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004470897_014

- Kovalev, R. K., and Kaelin, A. C., 2007. Circulation of Arab silver in medieval Afro-Eurasia: Preliminary observations. *History Compass* [online], 5(2), 560–580. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-0542.2006.00376.x>
- Kravets, M., and Ostapchuk, V., 2022. Cossacks as captive-takers in the Ottoman Black Sea region and unfreedom in the Northern countries. In: F. Roşu, ed., *Slavery in the Black Sea region, c.900–1900: Forms of unfreedom at the intersection between Christianity and Islam* [online]. Leiden: Brill, 250–335. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004470897_010
- Kuus, M., 2004. Europe's eastern expansion and the reinscription of otherness in East-Central Europe. *Progress in Human Geography* [online], 28(4), 472–89. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1191/0309132504ph498oa>
- Latysh, Y., 2024. Decolonization of historical memory in Ukraine during the Russo-Ukrainian war: Monuments and toponyms. *Topos* [online], 2, 54–92. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.61095/815-0047-2024-2-54-92>
- Magocsi, P. R., 2005. Galicia: A European land. In: C. Hann and P. R. Magocsi, eds., *Galicia: A multicultural land* [online]. University of Toronto Press, 3–21. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442675148-002>
- Majeska, G., 2009. Rus' and the Byzantine empire. In: A. Gleason, ed., *A companion to Russian history* [online]. Hoboken: Wiley Blackwell, 51–65. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444308419.ch4>
- Marszałek-Kowalewska, K., 2011. Iranian language policy: A case of linguistic purism. *Investigationes Linguisticae*, 22.
- Mbembe, A., 2021. *Out of the dark night: Essays on decolonization*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Micheau, F., 2008. Baghdad in the Abbasid era: A cosmopolitan and multiconfessional city. In: S. K. Jayyusi et al., eds., *The city in the Islamic world* [online]. Leiden: Brill, 219–245. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004162402.i-1500.60>
- Mignolo, W., 2021. *The politics of decolonial investigations (On decoloniality)* [online]. Durham: Duke University Press. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781478002574>
- Mignolo, W., 2023a. It is a change of era, no longer an era of changes. *Postcolonial Politics* [online], 29 June. Available at: <https://postcolonialpolitics.org/it-is-a-change-of-era-no-longer-the-era-of-changes/>
- Mignolo, W., 2023b. The explosion of globalism and the advent of the third nomos of the Earth. In: M. Steger et al., eds., *Globalization: Past, present, future* [online]. Berkeley: University of California Press. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1525/luminos.172.m>
- Mohan, G., and Tan-Mullins, M., 2019. The geopolitics of south–south infrastructure development: Chinese-financed energy projects in the Global South. *Urban Studies* [online], 56(7), 1368–85. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098018794351>

- Moosavi, L., 2019. A friendly critique of Asian Criminology and Southern Criminology. *British Journal of Criminology* [online], 59(2), 257–75. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azy045>
- Murphy, D. C., 2022. *China's rise in the Global South* [online]. Redwood City. Stanford University Press. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.11126/stanford/9781503630093.001.0001>
- Parvulescu, A., 2019. Eastern Europe as method. *The Slavic and East European Journal* [online], 63(4), 470–81. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.30851/634002>
- Patrick, S., and Huggins, A., 2023. The term “Global South” is surging. It should be retired. *Carnegie Endowment for Democracy* [online], 15 August. Available at: <https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2023/08/the-term-global-south-is-surging-it-should-be-retired?lang=en>
- Peirce, L., 2017. *Empress of the East: How a european Slave girl became queen of the Ottoman empire*. New York: Basic Books.
- Petryshyn, J., and Dzubak, L., 1985. *Peasants in the promised land: Canada and the Ukrainians, 1891-1914*. Toronto: James Lorimer & Company.
- Piacentini, L., and Slade, G., 2023. East is East? Beyond the Global North and Global South in criminology. *British Journal of Criminology* [online], 64(3). Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azad048>
- Plokhly, S., 2012. *The Cossack myth: History and nationhood in the age of empires* [online]. Cambridge University Press. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139135399>
- Plokhly, S., 2015. *The gates of Europe: A history of Ukraine*. New York: Basic Books.
- Plokhly, S., 2023. *The Russo-Ukrainian war: The return of history*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.f
- Pratt, J., and Melei, T., 2018. One of the smallest prison populations in the world under threat: The case of Tuvalu. In: K. Carrington et al., eds., *The Palgrave handbook of criminology and the Global South* [online]. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 729-751. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65021-0_35
- Pritsak, O., 1970. An Arabic text on trade route of the corporation of ar-Rūs in the second half of the ninth century. *Folia Orientalia*, 12, 241–259.
- Prunier, G., 2005. *Darfur: The ambiguous genocide*. London: Hurst & Co.
- Reiner, R., 2017. Is police culture cultural? *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, 11(3), 236–241.
- Reuss-Ianni, E., 1983. *Two cultures of policing: Street cops and management cops*. London: Routledge.
- Rodríguez Goyes, D., 2023. Southern Green Criminology: Fundamental concepts. In: D. Rodríguez Goyes, ed., *Green crime in the Global South* [online]. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27754-2>

- Rodríguez Goyes, D., *et al.*, 2021. Editors' Introduction to the special issue. *Critical Criminology* [online], 29, 423–429. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-021-09586-w>
- Roşu, F., 2022. Introduction. In: F. Roşu, ed., *Slavery in the Black Sea region, c.900-1900: Forms of unfreedom at the intersection between Christianity and Islam* [online]. Leiden: Brill, 1–16. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004470897_002
- Said, E. W., 2003. *Orientalism*. London: Penguin.
- Santos, B. S., 2022. Ukraine is a wake-up call for Europe. *Brave New Europe* [online], 11 August. Available at: <https://braveneweuropa.com/boaventura-de-sousa-santos-ukraine-is-a-wake-up-call-for-europe>.
- Shmatko, I., 2023. Waiting for Europe: Utopia, Narratives of the Imaginary West and the Materiality of Police Culture in Ukraine, *The British Journal of Criminology* [online], 63(5), 1327–1342. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azac087>.
- Shumilova, O., *et al.* 2025. Environmental effects of the Kakhovka Dam destruction by warfare in Ukraine. *Science* [online], 387(6739), 1181-1186. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.adn8655>
- Snyder, T., 2015. Integration and disintegration: Europe, Ukraine, and the world. *Slavic Review* [online], 74(4), 695–707. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.5612/slavicreview.74.4.695>
- Sozzo, M., 2022. Inequality, welfare and punishment. Comparative notes between the Global North and South. *European Journal of Criminology* [online], 19(3), 368-393. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/14773708211060164>
- Spivak, G. C., 2006. Are you postcolonial? To the teachers of Slavic and eastern European literatures. *PMLA* [online], 121(3), 828–36. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1632/S0030812900165903>
- Spivak, G. C., 2010. Can the subaltern speak? In: R. C. Morris, ed., *Can the subaltern speak? Reflections on the history of an idea*. New York: Columbia University Press, 21–81.
- Subtelny, O., 2001. Expulsion, resettlement, civil strife: The fate of Poland's Ukrainians, 1944-1947. In: A. Siljak and P. Ther, eds., *Redrawing nations: Ethnic cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948* [online]. London: Rowman & Littlefield, 155-173. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.5040/9798216411321.ch-7>
- Todorova, M., 2009. *Imagining the Balkans* [online]. Oxford University. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195387865.001.0001>
- United Nations Ukraine. 2023. *Potential long-term impact of the destruction of the Kakhovka dam* [online]. Joint analytical note. 9 June. Available at: <https://ukraine.un.org/en/235545-potential-long-term-impact-destruction-kakhovka-dam>
- UNODC, 2025. *Global study on homicide* [online]. Available at: <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/global-study-on-homicide.html>

- Van Hulst, M., 2013. Storytelling at the police station: The canteen culture revisited. *The British Journal of Criminology* [online], 53(4), 624–42. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azt014>
- Van Maanen, J., 1973. Observations on the making of policemen. *Human Organization*, 32(4), 407–18.
- Waisbich, L. T., Roychoudhury, S., and Haug, S., 2021. Beyond the single story: “Global South” polyphonies. *Third World Quarterly* [online], 42(9), 2086–95. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.1948832>
- Webber, J., Schwarz, C., and Francisco, J., 2018. *Rediscovering traces of memory: The Jewish heritage of Polish Galicia* [online]. Liverpool University Press. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.3828/liverpool/9781786940872.001.0001>
- Williams, B. G., 2002. Hidden ethnocide in the Soviet Muslim borderlands: The ethnic cleansing of the Crimean Tatars. *Journal of Genocide Research* [online], 4(3), 357–373. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14623520220151952>
- Wolff, L., 1994. *Inventing Eastern Europe: The map of civilization on the mind of the enlightenment*. Redwood City: Stanford University Press.
- Wolff, L., 1995. Voltaire’s public and the idea of Eastern Europe: Toward a literary sociology of continental division. *Slavic Review* [online], 54(4), 932–42. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.2307/2501400>
- Wolff, L., 2010. *The idea of Galicia: History and fantasy in Habsburg political culture*. Redwood City: Stanford University Press.
- Yavuz, H., 2020. *Nostalgia for the empire: The politics of Neo-Ottomanism* [online]. Oxford University Press. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197512289.001.0001>
- Zarycki, T., 2014. *Ideologies of eastness in Central and Eastern Europe*. London: Routledge.
- Živković, M., 2011. *Serbian dreambook: National imaginary in the time of Milošević* [online]. Indiana University Press. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.2979/6176.0>