

## Perspectives on the Militarization of Public Security in Contemporary Brazil

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### Abstract

Brazil still has not fully accomplished procedural democracy, despite being a formal democracy funded on a federal constitution and on an organized judicial system. The country has not been able to foster the principles of justice, peace, development, and equity for most of the population, and the state apparatus is restricted regarding social control, transparency, and effectiveness of public policies. This scenario resulted in the rise of violence, criminality, organized crime, and urban disorder, which has led to the militarization of public security both with the improvement of the military police's structure and with the presence of the armed forces performing public security activities. This process of militarization has increased in the last two years, and for the first time since 1985, the military managed to ascend to the most powerful positions in the Brazilian government. This article discusses the militarization of public security in Brazil, pointing to the risks of a new and enduring process of militarization of Brazilian society, which still suffers from limited rights and lack of constitutional guarantees.

### Key words

Public security; police; police violence; militarization

### Resumen

Brasil aún no ha alcanzado del todo la democracia procedimental, a pesar de ser una democracia formal fundada en una constitución federal y en un sistema judicial organizado. El país no ha sido capaz de fomentar los principios de justicia, paz, desarrollo e igualdad para la mayoría de la población, y el aparato estatal está limitado respecto al control social, la transparencia y la eficacia de las políticas públicas. Este panorama resultó en el aumento de la violencia, el crimen, el crimen

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organizado y el desorden urbano, lo cual ha llevado a la militarización de la seguridad pública, tanto con la mejora de la estructura de la policía militar como con la presencia de las fuerzas armadas en actividades de seguridad pública. El proceso de militarización ha aumentado en los dos últimos años, y, por primera vez desde 1985, los militares consiguieron alcanzar los puestos de poder más importantes en el gobierno de Brasil. El artículo se ocupa de la militarización de la seguridad pública en Brasil, apuntando a los peligros de un nuevo y duradero proceso de militarización de la sociedad brasileña, la cual aún sufre de derechos limitados y de una falta de garantías constitucionales.

**Palabras clave**

Seguridad pública; policía; violencia policial; militarización

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## 1. Introduction

The main purpose of this article is to ascertain that the militarization of public security contemplates two correlated dimensions. One of them concerns the militarization of typical institutions of public security, such as the police, called here "police militarization". The other presents more intense and regular participation of the military in matters of public security, called here "armed forces policialization". The two dimensions are analyzed because they both assume that public security and the maintenance of social order are roles of militarized institutions. As such, regarding the competencies, training, patterns of intervention, use of force and their own nature, police and military, in Brazil, are becoming increasingly indifferenciated.

Brazil is a federal republic composed of 26 states and one Federal District. The states have financial, administrative and political autonomy, and therefore, can establish rules for the functioning of political institutions and public policies. In their political and institutional structure, states have specific agencies focused on public security policies. Historically, the civilian and military police have been the essential organs for the security policy in the Brazilian states. Therefore, the states are responsible for the Brazilian police forces, except for the Federal Police, the Federal Highway Police and the Port Police. The state's legislative branch defines the regulations regarding the police force's operation, approving staffing, budgeting, and significant legal functions of police forces. However, police commanders have high autonomy to define priorities and actions. The so-called military police in Brazil is the force that has the most relative importance in the structure of public security, both in terms of budget and personnel. The military police are responsible for ostensive, i.e., the social and police control over society's daily life. Therefore, an essential part of the police in the country depends on a militarized organization, which is a result of the security militarization promoted by the military dictatorship of the period 1964-1985.<sup>1</sup>

The 1988 Brazilian Constitution presents an extensive list of rights, unequivocally and establishing the principle of the rule of law and guarantees against state violence. However, it does not substantively alter the police structure built throughout the twentieth century (and heavily militarized in the 1970s).<sup>2</sup> The process of re-democratization in Brazil, which started in 1985 and was conducted through a conservative transition to the rule of law, did not change the framework of police militarization. Over the past two decades, despite advances in the protection of human rights in the country, public security has gradually gained militarized features.<sup>3</sup>

In the 1990s, for example, public security institutions in Rio de Janeiro were considered in crises since they were not able to offer security when faced with the fear caused by the upsurge of drug trafficking in communities, which had been transformed in territories ruled by criminals and segregated socially and economically from the rest of the city.<sup>4</sup> The violence fuels the nowadays hegemonic perception of

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<sup>1</sup> One of the premises of this work is that militarization has always been in the social historical formation of the country as a republic, i.e., it has been present since the implementation of the republic in Brazil. However, the military dictatorship largely enhanced the militarization of public security in the country.

<sup>2</sup> The 1988 Brazilian Constitution established the tripartite model of the Brazilian police structure: Federal Police, Civil Police and Military Police. The Armed Forces was designated as an entity to be called upon to guarantee law and order (Souza Neto 2008, Fontoura *et al.* 2009).

<sup>3</sup> The 1988 Brazilian Constitution has a chapter specific to public security. However, "the 1988 Constitution did not give back to the Civil Police some of the roles it had before the beginning of the military regime," which contributed to "consolidating the militarization of the civil part of security" (Zaverucha 2005, pp. 75-76). The 1988 Constitution confirmed the organization of the repressive apparatus formulated during the dictatorship. In the area of security and police, there was no transition, but full continuity (Pinheiro 1991, p. 51).

<sup>4</sup> In the early 2000s, some attempts to change public security occurred in Rio de Janeiro. However, the model of armed military intervention in communities and militarized pressure on the city's favelas and hills is a routine that causes a very high degree of confrontation with deaths, in most cases, on one side of the "front," that is, the police exercise a circle of control on the gigantic poverty areas of the city (Soares 2000).

failure of public security institutions. Also, it is noteworthy the criminalization, on a large scale, of the poorer population, which is subject to a genocidal policy of combating illicit drugs (Batista 2012). As a rule, security policies in Brazil have always had the characteristic of social control of poverty, focusing mainly on favelas, peripheral areas, and black youth. Therefore, public security in Brazil has always had a political component as an instrument to maintain inequality through the distribution of “selective state violence” (Teixeira 2016). Drug trafficking, mostly controlled by criminal organizations in both São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, has served as a justification for adopting drastic security policies based on invading favelas, murdering of young traffickers, and massive arrests. Over time, special police units were created to ensure the armed invasion of communities, with internationally well-known lethal results, portrayed in books, films, and documentaries.<sup>5</sup> Gradually, the public opinion was convinced with the image of a well-organized and heavily armed crime, defeating a weak and poorly armed police force, limited by having to respect the constitutional provisions. Since the 1990s, a strongly retributive and punitive component has gained traction as a solution to resume the threatened social order. Slowly, metaphors of war began to be triggered by the media and the government, justifying handing out more powers and weapons to the police (Serra and Souza 2018).<sup>6</sup>

While traditional police and public security measures seemed to be inefficient, the idea of appealing to the military to play a more significant role in public security started to be considered. In practice, the presence of the military in public security was observed during global conferences such as the 1992 UN Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, as well as in the implementation of urban projects that reinforced fortified enclaves such as the construction of condominiums and shopping malls. In these cases, the military was called upon to provide logistics, and material and human support, as well as to act to maintain the order.<sup>7</sup> Increasingly, the scenes of police violence, the use of heavy weapons, training of warfare and guerrilla techniques, hooded soldiers in armored vehicles, became usual and part of the daily life of the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. Therefore, public opinion accepted the presence of heavily armed soldiers of the armed forces in big Brazilian cities<sup>8</sup>. This process became more evident with the creation of the National Security Force and the authorization given to municipal guards to carry firearms. In 2010, for example, the federal government assigned police powers to the Armed Forces. This measure allowed the military to carry out police activities such as searching people, vehicles, vessels, as well as detaining suspects in border areas. It is important to say that Brazilian military forces, on behalf of the United Nations, were already playing a significant role in the social and political stabilization of Haiti (the Brazilian military presence was reinforced after

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<sup>5</sup> The Military Police, in 1969, gained the exclusive competence for ostensive policing. In the same year, the federal government prohibited the states to create any other form of police force. The Military Police then became reserve force of the Army and the elite troops were created. These troops have played an important role in the political repression and assembly of the repressive apparatus of the Brazilian State: the Tobias de Aguiar Ostensive Surveillance (ROTA) and the *Batalhao de Choque* (Shock Troop), operating in the State of São Paulo, for example. The elite force of the authoritarian militarism, ROTA, produced the highest rates of police lethality during the dictatorship in Brazil, and today it still shows a high level of violence in its operations. The shock troop had and still has a prominent role in the control of crowds, strikes, and public demonstrations. It was marked by its role in the *Carandiru* massacre in 1992, when 111 inmates were killed (Zaverucha 2005, Battibugli 2007, Souza 2009). The films *Cidade de Deus* (City of God), *Carandiru*, *Tropa de Elite* (Elite Squad), and the documentary *Noticias de uma Guerra Particular* (News from a Personal War) help to understand the militarized state violence (Macedo 2015).

<sup>6</sup> Opinion polls taken in the 1990s show that the Army, the Fire Department and the Post Office are the institutions most trusted by the Brazilian population. Even today, an important part of public opinion believes that the Army can solve the problem of crime and urban insecurity.

<sup>7</sup> The notion of a fortified enclave was borrowed from Caldeira (2001) and reflects the contemporary situation in Brazilian cities that are held hostage by the violence, building walls, electronic alarm systems, and typical warfare strategies, such as access control, surveillance with drones, security cameras, and a whole private security apparatus, with strong militarized connotations, including militias and extermination groups. It is, therefore, a militarized management of cities (Graham 2016, Azzi 2017).

<sup>8</sup> For instance, opinion poll taken in 2018 by Paraná Institute in the whole country indicates a general approval over the military intervention on public security policies (see Fontes 2018).

the earthquake that struck the country in January 2010),<sup>9</sup> performing operations beyond the traditional military activity. The public opinion acceptance and demand for militarization were responded by the policy of occupation of territories dominated by drug trafficking and the implementation of the Pacifying Police Units (known as UPPs) in Rio de Janeiro (Fleury 2012, Serra and Zaccone 2012). Another example of militarization is the security of major international events that took place in Rio de Janeiro, which counted on planning and presence of the Armed Forces. Since the beginning of the 2000s, it is possible to observe in the city a constant request for military intervention in order to tackle the so-called failure of public security, reminding that the military police in Brazil is subordinated to the Brazilian Army.

This process of militarization has recently been radicalized, going beyond the borders of public security and occupying the country's political scene. This article does not intend to analyze Brazil's political and social militarization in detail, but some elements of this dimension must be highlighted. In January 2019, for the first time since 1985, the Brazilian federal government was occupied by a president and a vice-president coming from the army. As a result of the national election, military (armed forces and military police) assumed prominent roles in the political structure of the federal and states governments. It is the first time in its history that Brazil witnesses such a massive occupation of the institutional political space by the military. This context may represent a new phase of Brazilian society, where militarization of power takes place without a military coup (considering that the country went through an institutional coup in 2016, with the impeachment of President Rousseff. The impeachment counted on the strong public support from the press, right-wing and extreme right-wing political parties, businesspeople and the judiciary). Militarism, therefore, has never been this strong in the country and will undoubtedly lead to the prominence of conservative agendas and excessive patriotism in the power strategies in the coming years.

## 2. "State of exception" as a framework of analysis

Over the past 30 years, there has been an unprecedented expansion of crime control strategies in Western societies. The characteristics of this expansion are the increasing incarceration, increase in the length of penalties, dissemination of surveillance and use of electronic mechanisms, and dissemination of firearms (Garland 2008). The so-called late modernity in terms of security policies witnessed the attempts to address high crime rates using robust strategies, including the model of war on drugs and terror. Because of brutal disinvestment in social policies and the perception that traditional criminal justice institutions were in crisis, the militarized model became a benchmark in the Western states' strategies against urban social movements, criminal organizations, and migratory flows (Graham 2016).

Therefore, based on Giorgio Agamben's (2004) notion of "state of exception", we argue that the militarization corresponds to the normalization of militarism and its consequences in terms of limitations of rights and legitimation of state violence, especially police violence. The perspective adopted here in order to understand the current scenario in Brazil is the perspective of an exception that becomes the rule (Agamben 2004). The state of exception is both a framework of the legal institutions and a general government tactic applied by the emerging social multiplicities. It reinforces the authoritarian-repressive apparatus within the law while making the boundary between legality and illegality ambiguous. The state of exception would then be the political space in which violence is justifiable even when it directly injures the legal norm because it allows war mechanisms to be activated (Agamben 2004).

Within militarized management, there is the intention of the military supremacy regarding risk and force management, in which life and death are the core elements.

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<sup>9</sup> The Brazilian army led the UN stabilization mission in Haiti. In the preparation for the UN mission that, as said, was not only a military operation, Brazilian soldiers trained with the military police of Rio de Janeiro in armed operations carried out in the favelas (Aguiar 2012).

The militarized system establishes new limits, permeable and imprecise, between living and dying. Thus, there is no contradiction between the politicization of death and the strategy of biopolitical power (Foucault 1999). The militarization of state apparatus and the nationalization of paramilitary groups show that the power of death and destruction is central to biopolitical strategies that produce social inequalities and asymmetries of power distribution in the country. Death, or the possibility of death, is part of the militarized biopolitical engine. The military forms of intervention are included in the sovereign exception insofar as the power to kill, in times of war, is appropriated by the police and rationalized by militarism in a permanent struggle against an imaginary enemy. Thus, killing is an integral part of a system to control the lives of those who deserve to live at the cost of the massacre of those who must die (Foucault 1999, Agamben 2004).

Governing the population and managing life are the elements that justify the high costs of the deaths adopted as security and risk-management strategies. Also, it is important to clarify that state violence and the more subtle forms of economic risk management are not exclusive. Western societies, in the wake of the dismantling of the welfare state, have invested in the model of social control by incarceration, ghettoization of entire social groups, widespread high-tech surveillance, and systematic violation of citizens' rights (Wacquant 1999, Bauman 1999, 2008, Garland 2008, Beck 2010). We argue that these characteristics do not contradict the militarized security model. Repressive security policies can be considered as extensions of the war in social life using violence.

The new technologies of power are moving toward governing the population and the administration of life. Therefore, this is a historical process that is still evolving (Foucault 2008). This process can be designated by the incursion of life and politics in the dimension of security, in a context that can be called a punitive society or society of control. While advanced Western societies are entering unprecedented economic crises, in the wake of the dismantling of the old model of the welfare state, there is private and public investment in the dimension of social control through high incarceration rates, the obsession for security and punishment (Wacquant 1999, Garland 2008).

### **3. (In)distinctions between military police and armed forces in Brazil**

The internal security of the national states in the Western world was built as an extension of militarism since the states promoted wars of conquest, domination, and territorial dispute while creating mechanisms of social control of their populations (Elias 1990, Tilly 1996). In other words, the process of states' internal pacification occurred while these states were engaged in wars outside their territories. The constitution of permanent and professional armed forces corresponds to the construction of civilizing processes and internal pacification. Thus, the project of "social pacification" is connected to the notion of "armed peace" and strongly reifies the idea – so internalized in Brazilian society – of the continuous construction of an enemy! There is a perverse perspective that acts as binomial: war and enemy. Internal security can be understood as an extension of warfare through state-orchestrated violence, but also through other means, such as the justice and the police. In short, the state has the monopoly of legitimate physical violence (Elias 1990, Foucault 1999).

The police model in continental European countries was built in this process, as the king's police, who defended him against external enemies and against rebelled, infidel, or heretic subjects. The police were also an extension of the judges' power

and formed an army occupying a territory permanently.<sup>10</sup> Military institutions, in the context of the formation and expansion of the states' territory, started to exercise internal security. The division between police and war roles began to take place at the beginning of the nineteenth century: militarized policing and policing as political management of the population started to be characterized (Fogelson 1977, Emsley 1991). The military garrisons, stationed in various regions of the state's territory, started to share their attributions with the police that at that moment were part of the legal structure. This is basically the French model, which would be exported to several countries after the Napoleonic era: the policing model shared between *gendarmerie* and the national police (Dieu 1993, Bauer and Ventre 2001). The *gendarmerie* increasingly assumed the role of armed and preventive policing and, gradually, assumed a prominent role in managing the population, that is, a process of "governmentalization" of the national state (Foucault 2008).

The Anglo-Saxon model, based on common law, is an experience different from the increasing militarization of security. The police were considered an extension of the community; police officers were considered citizens, fulfilling a community mandate. Policing was considered a form of self-monitoring. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the English people did not accept the presence of the police as an army, a situation that changed with the creation of the London Metropolitan Police in 1829. The police created during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries took the London Metropolitan Police as a reference. It was formed by identified civil police officers who did not use firearms and were instructed to control the public order, in a permanent, continuous, and strategic manner. Instead of policing only in casual situations using troops of armed officers randomly walking around the social space in search of evildoers – as was the practice in the model adopted in continental Europe – the famous "English Bobby" walked around his policing sector daily, getting to know the local problems, as well as building trust between government and citizens, i.e., policing by consent (Emsley 1991, Waddington 1999). In any case, police organizations, built on the French or English models, for more than one hundred and fifty years, have become complicated, costly, and have taken on a prominent political role (Emsley 1989, Reiner 1992).<sup>11</sup>

For this article, the militarization of public security contemplates two correlated dimensions. One of them concerns the militarization of typical institutions of public security, such as the police, called here "police militarization". The other dimension presents more intense and regular participation of the military in matters of public security, called here "armed forces policialization". The two dimensions are analyzed because they both assume that public security and the maintenance of social order are roles of militarized institutions. The most apparent discussion of militarization concerns the definition of crimes committed by military police officers – when performing police functions – such as military crimes. In this case, the crimes are considered disciplinary transgressions, subject to their military code, process, and justice. Military police, therefore, respond to military justice and, if punished, serve

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<sup>10</sup> This is basically the model adopted in Portuguese America, until the arrival of the Portuguese royal family in 1808 in Brazil, when a specific police force was created in Rio de Janeiro. Moreover, Brazilian experience in policing is strongly attached to the violence routinely and extensively applied over the slaves and against slave rebellion during the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Holloway 1997). After the republic foundation in the late 19<sup>th</sup>, Brazilian police have become an instrument of repression of the urban working classes (Souza 2009, Rosemberg 2010).

<sup>11</sup> In current debates on the definition of police and policing, the use of force is not the only element to establish the notion and practice of police. This definition maintains the conceptual similarity between the police and the army. The distinction is observed insofar as the police are characterized by using information, the prohibition of systematic use of force (physically represented in the firearm), and the contact with the citizen who receives the services (Ericson and Haggerty 1997, Bayley 2006). The armed forces are characterized by the monopoly of force, the use of firearms as a form of deterrence and deactivation of threats, and isolation in relation to the context of the operation. This is, however, a theoretical debate. The practice of government institutions and strategies have several ambiguities that brings attention to problems not yet solved in the young continental democracies (Lima 1995, Bayley 2001).



a sentence in a special prison. The military police have training in military academies and an organizational structure that follows the model of quartering. This is a long debate, but in short, crimes committed by military police against civilians would be treated with more complacency than disciplinary crimes (Zaverucha 2005, Rosemberg 2010).

Regarding the competencies, training, and their nature, police, and military in Brazil, are becoming increasingly similar. Police and army hold the state monopoly of physical force through the authorized and legal use of the firearm. However, the police have the characteristic of avoiding the use of weapons; when the use of weapons is necessary, the officer has to observe the principle of proportionality, and the circumstance of use must be to avoid a greater evil. In practice, the use of force must be restricted to the means necessary to stop an action, to hold the person who commits a crime and to bring them to justice. The idea is to prevent crime and stop the criminal. The army, on the other hand, recommends the use of the weapon as a deterrent and combat tool par excellence. The purpose is, therefore, to immobilize and liquidate the enemy, if necessary. Due to this difference, there are important distinctions regarding the type of weapons, instruction, and training, as well as of the functions of the police and army. In terms of nature and practice, the police have the role of policing as a rule, with the use of information for crime prevention; therefore do not make use of tactics and war strategy. The army has no role to play in policing in urban contexts in the absence of deep social commotion or threats of war. In Brazil, police and military responsibilities are legally defined. Despite all the experience of designing public security as a matter of national security, the legislation does not authorize these institutions to go out of their legal mandate. In recent years, however, with the adoption of anti-terror legislation and decrees related to guaranteeing order, public security has been confused with national security. This situation is problematic, and perhaps what is more shocking is that the police are still understood as state defense agencies, instead of organizations designed to protect the citizens. This conception is responsible for the alarming figures of police violence and the perpetuation of the "warrior" ethos among police officers, where "a good thief is a dead thief".<sup>12</sup> Apart from the problem of the persistent militarized model, the police are formed by different institutions with relative autonomy and marked by incommunicability: there is the so-called "civil police", responsible for the investigation, and the "military police", responsible for crime prevention. That is, the militarized model also creates a police system based on institutional isolation, which hinders the circulation of information. Also, the experiences of intervention of the army (or militarized institutions) in public security point to persistent violence, ineffectiveness, intolerance to diversity and to plurality within the military organization, resistance to civilian control over the armed forces, and lack of external accountability (Santos 2011, Cardoso 2012, Fleury 2012).

In that sense, this article claims that the debate about the militarization of public security has to do with the broad process of militarization of police and securitization of the military. These perspectives put the problem of the growth of police violence and the weakness of public oversight on police affairs. As such, municipalities, which historically had their share of responsibility in the area of security, since the 1988 Constitution have had the prerogative to create their police guards. The Constitution allows municipalities to create guards only to assist in the oversight of public services and to protect the city's patrimony. However, several Brazilian cities have formed their small "armies" of police carrying firearms, many of them performing police powers or assisting the police in roles related to fighting crimes (Sento-Sé 2005). The number of armed police officers has grown, in response to the pressure from the

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<sup>12</sup> When analyzing disjunctive democracy, Caldeira (2001) argues that the military dictatorship de-legitimized Human Rights, inasmuch as the dictatorship's supporters (mostly military and military police officers), referred to human rights defenders as "criminal's protectors". According to their rationale, a criminal (i.e., the "thief"), does not deserve the protection from the rule of law. This rationale is still present in the current process of intensification of militarism in Brazilian society.

media for more security and following the exponential growth of the private security market.<sup>13</sup>

Although in the last decade homicide committed by military police officers in service may be judged by the universal justice (when there is an investigation carried out both by the military apparatus and the civil police), military police officers are still subject to military justice. Their crimes or deviations are investigated and tried through military disciplinary mechanisms and commissions. The police officer, in their civil work, responds to the police department's internal affairs, which has primarily military characteristics and is an instrument for internal disciplinary control. In recent years, the police created ombudsmen offices, but these structures do not have investigative power, are limited to collecting complaints and referring them to the prosecuting authorities. The external control of the military police is still little developed in the country, which gives the military police large margins of arbitration when performing a civil role such as that of public security. The 1988 Federal Constitution did not amend the Code of Military Criminal Procedure (CPPM) nor the decision of the Federal Supreme Court of 1978, which defined the military forum to prosecute police officers (Zaverucha 2010). Therefore, when a police officer commits a crime, a military police investigation (IPM) is conducted, presided over by a colleague. A trial then takes place on the so-called sentencing committees, formed by four military judges and a judge advocate. In order to be a military judge, one has only to have a rank higher than that of the police officer being judged. For many analysts, this is undoubtedly a recipe for impunity for crimes committed by military police officers. This situation perpetuates the practices of violence and the lack of public trust in public security agents (Zaverucha 2010, Nóbrega Júnior 2010, Lima 2011).

#### 4. The (im)possible way to demilitarize the police

The militarization of security is a fundamental problem of Latin American societies, which suffer from drug trafficking, smuggling of firearms and goods, and trafficking of people. The US policy has insisted on direct intervention in drug-producing countries through a strong militarization of combat using elements such as weapons, helicopters, guerrilla specialized professionals, and personnel with military training. Latin American integration seems to be based on mutual mistrust and reinforcement of militarism as a vector of international relations.<sup>14</sup> In addition, changes in war doctrines have marked, since the early 2000s, the emergence of asymmetric wars, have approximated the traditional war doctrine based on destruction, occupation, and pacification to a status of permanent war, with continuous occupation, minimization of human and increase of technological resources. War has been incorporated into the logic of risk, according to which the war has an economic and biopolitical component that should not be neglected. Therefore, war becomes a permanent issue (Gros 2006).

Research carried out at the request of the Ministry of Justice in 2009 to subsidize the work of the First National Conference on Public Security indicated the dissatisfaction

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<sup>13</sup> The militarized model may be considered responsible for the failure of the community police projects in the State of São Paulo. During the 1990s, the military police took on the task of creating a model of community policing, with the establishment of community security bases, using vehicles adapted for this purpose. The police also developed a comprehensive school policing program. All these initiatives were abandoned, and traditional strategies of ostensive policing, with armed confrontations and specialized vehicles were reinforced (Loche 2014).

<sup>14</sup> The militarization of public security in Latin America is surveyed in *URVIO. Revista Latinoamericana de Seguridad Ciudadana*, nº 12, 2012, special issue on *Militarización de la seguridad ciudadana* (Pontón Cevallos 2012). Anyway, it is important to see variations among countries such as Colombia, heavily militarized because guerrilla warfare and drug trafficking, and Argentina and Chile, because the more successful process of bringing police to the accountability of civil government after the debacle of military dictatorships. Prior to that, Latin American countries, since the 1970s, have deepened the militarization of security within the framework of military dictatorships in the continent. The Operation Condor was the hallmark of this process (Abramovici 2001).

of security professionals with the militarized structure. The research interviewed 64,130 professionals, and 60% of them criticized the connection between the military police and the army. Also, 65.6% of the respondents considered that the hierarchy of their institution causes disrespect and professional injustices. Among military police officers in the lower ranks, 73.3% criticized the effects of the hierarchy. Of them, 81% believe there is a lot of rigor in internal issues and little in matters that affect public security. The research highlights that "military police are not organized as police, but as small armies that deviate from their functions", and the effects of this situation are the precariousness in coping with crime, difficulty in exercising internal control (implying high rates of corruption), and frequent insensitivity in the relationship with citizens (Soares *et al.* 2009).

As mentioned above, the model of military intervention in public security has become a regular practice of the Brazilian state. The army was called in to provide security at the 1992 UN Earth Summit, and on several occasions, the army intervened in actions in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. The army was requested to account for security in the 1997 police strikes and to ensure security during the 2007 Pan American Games in Rio de Janeiro. In addition, it has played a role in the feasibility of projects for the construction and renovation of housing and infrastructure for accessibility in the communities of Rio de Janeiro, within the federal government's Growth Acceleration Plan (PAC). Internationally, the army plays a leading role in the UN stabilization mission in Haiti. The soldiers sent to the mission were trained by the police in Rio de Janeiro to deal with urban guerrilla and threats posed by youth gangs (Mariano and Freitas 2002, Brito and Barp 2005, Fontoura 2005).

Other examples are the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup, where a military defense operation was formed with 23,000 soldiers at the cost of R\$710 million (O Estado de S. Paulo 2013b); the World Youth Day, promoted by the Catholic Church, counted on the services of the military to protect the Pope (Stochero 2013); during the demonstrations that occurred all over the country in June 2013, the military was called to secure the main government buildings in Brasilia (Correio Braziliense 2013, O Estado de S. Paulo 2013a).

In 2014, the military worked to provide security during the FIFA World Cup. The security of the event was coordinated by the Ministry of Justice with support from the Ministry of Defense and was divided into three sections: a) security, coordinated by the Extraordinary Secretariat for Security in Major Events of the Ministry of Justice (SESGE/MJ) responsible for coordinating federal, states, and municipalities agencies involved in public security and civil defense; b) defense, formed by the armed forces (Army, Navy, and Aeronautics); and c) intelligence, formed by the Brazilian Intelligence Agency and the Institutional Security Office of the Presidency. The federal government invested about R\$1.17 billion in equipment and training of the security forces, which gathered approximately 180,000 people, among them, 100,000 police officers, 60,000 soldiers, and 20,000 private security professionals. The Armed Forces were responsible for the defense of airspace and maritime boundaries, guarding critical infrastructure, defense in case of attacks with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (QBRN) weapons, as well as counterterrorism actions. In each state hosting games of the World Cup, there was an army contingency force, on average with 3,000 soldiers, ready to reinstate the order under the command of a general, who would act if the governor of the respective state requested the President. These examples show that the theme of armed forces policialization deserves more attention and further research (Portal da Copa 2014a, 2014b, Castro 2014).

As for the issue of demilitarization of public security, it can be conducted progressively, starting from a) the decentralization of the work of the military police, facilitating integration with the civil police; b) organizational innovation, with new policing modalities; c) new forms of relationship between public authority and social issues, avoiding the criminalization of poverty, and social movements; d) reduction

of tensions between officers and troops. Demilitarization can be achieved when taking into account the need to a) amend the constitution in the provisions about the issue, allowing each state to implement the best arrangement according to their needs and giving the possibility to develop full-cycle police (only one police corporation responsible for repression, investigation, prevention, and protection of the public order), both civil and military; b) establish the regulations to paragraph 7 of article 144 of the Brazilian Constitution, to promote a better division of tasks, to maximize cooperation and to minimize disputes among the different police; c) demilitarize the police and create full-cycle civilian police; d) create full-scale military police; or, e) deploy police organized by geographical circumscription or by type of crime. Municipal guards could take the role of community policing (Zaverucha 2010). The Bill for Constitutional Amendment 51 (PEC51), conceives a security policy that contemplates full-cycle, demilitarized, and single career police. It is an important step in the construction of a demilitarized police system (Senador Lindbergh Farias *et al.* 2014, Soares 2014).

## 5. Conclusion

Since the 1990s, public discussions about police in Brazil have become frequent. However, the agenda of police reform has reached a point of stagnation. One of the limitations of the debate was the issue of demilitarization. All the experiences of public policies in Brazil reinforced the military model of territorial occupation. The problem, however, is not militarism *per se*, but the fact that militarism prevents the experience of other models and strategies. Also, militarism views security as a state problem and a case of defense of sovereignty, reinforcing the misleading idea that security must have a deterrent dimension.

In this sense, we insist that militarization in Brazil nowadays is a matter of historical permanence, which has occurred since the beginning of the Republic, and continues to operate under the logic of “war” and “enemy”. This context exposes the contradictions of the rule of law in Brazil, as formulated more specifically by Agamben (2004), that the rule of law produces its exceptions. Sometimes, as in this case, the exceptions become permanent.

The problem in Brazil today is the lack of opportunities to try new models regarding police structure because the current model is established through constitutional provisions and there is a powerful political lobby by military and military police against any substantive changes. Therefore, short-term changes are unlikely to occur. Also, research shows that including human rights and incorporating some courses on humanities into the training of military police officers is not enough (Soares *et al.* 2009). Brazilian public officials and politicians could lead the country to a path of innovation in security, but the result of the October 2018 elections is extraordinarily discouraging. The elections indicated a resurgence of militarization in the country, with all the harmful and perverse effects of its practices in the formation of Brazilian society, as observed throughout the history of the country as a republic. Thus, a reflection on deconstructing the current model of police structure is already a step toward making “possible” something that is still “impossible”.

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